How US Investors are Reshaping European Football

Over the past decade, U.S. investors have funnelled billions into European football, acquiring marquee clubs like Chelsea, AC Milan, and Everton, as well as numerous minority stakes. While these investments have driven record revenues, returns have been mixed.

Public listings, such as Manchester United’s 2012 IPO, offered limited liquidity, and secondary sales like Elliott’s stake in AC Milan are still in early stages. On-field losses at Chelsea and negative ROI at Manchester United highlight the risks involved. High-profile restructurings, such as AC Milan’s refinancing, and regulatory challenges like Financial Fair Play (FFP) complicate exit strategies.  With typical investment horizons of five to seven years, true ROI realizations may not materialize until 2026–2028, contingent on market valuations, legal clearances, and the emergence of new investors.

If American investors are looking to cash out, who will step in?

Over the past twenty years, European football has seen waves of foreign capital – from Russian oligarchs to China’s golden age of acquisitions to Gulf sovereign funds intensifying investments – yet there’s limited sign of Japanese suitors, Brazilian investors, Indian backers, or African tycoons on the horizon. Meanwhile, many European investors have become more risk-averse, unwilling to underwrite mounting losses. In England, despite widespread interest, few domestic billionaires are willing to take control of their local clubs, and most no longer reside in the UK.

In this entry, I will focus on the major deals, as the saying goes, “money talks.” American investors have certainly backed their ambitions with substantial financial commitments, significantly influencing the landscape of global sports. Their involvement has, in my view, positively transformed football by emphasizing the commercialization of the sport, aiming to make it more sustainable and competitive.

It hasn’t all been plain sailing. There have been some real disasters, such as 777 Partners’ financial collapse, which led to their failed takeover of Everton and left clubs like Genoa and Hertha BSC in turmoil. Similarly, Pacific Media Group’s ownership saw multiple clubs relegated and bankrupted, with reports of the owner being locked in a toilet by angry fans after K.V. Oostende’s downfall. Fortunately, there has been more good than bad. As a Liverpool FC fan, I’m very happy with the current ownership.

1. The Scale of the U.S. Invasion

1.1 Explosive Growth in Club Valuations

Between 2016 and 2023, the aggregate enterprise value of Europe’s top 32 clubs surged by 96%, outpacing major stock indices and attracting significant private equity interest.

1.2 High-Profile Acquisitions

• Chelsea (2022): Todd Boehly and Clearlake Capital acquired the club for £2.5 billion, with an additional commitment of £1.75 billion for investments.

• AC Milan (2018–2022): Elliott Management converted debt into equity before selling to RedBird Capital, exemplifying a debt-engineering entry and exit model.

• Everton (2024): The Friedkin Group acquired 98.8% of the club for over £400 million, joining nine other Premier League clubs under majority U.S. ownership-constituting 50% of the league.

2. Exit Mechanisms

2.1 Public Listings

• Manchester United’s 2012 IPO: raised $233 million on the New York Stock Exchange at $14 per share, valuing the club at $2.3 billion. However, the IPO was priced below the expected range of $16–$20 per share, and subsequent trading was lackluster; high finance costs and limited free float constrained returns, making the IPO a “tough sell” in hindsight. Twelve years later, Sir Jim Ratcliffe acquired a 25% stake in Manchester United for approximately $1.5 billion and committed an additional $300 million investment into the club’s infrastructure. This move has diverted much of the fan frustration away from the Glazers, as Ratcliffe now oversees football operations.

2.2 Secondary Sales & Refinancings

• AC Milan: In December 2024, RedBird Capital refinanced the vendor loan with Elliott, including a €170 million top-up and extending loan maturities to 2028, setting the stage for a future resale.

2.3 Strategic Disposals & Club-to-Club Transfers

• Elliott’s Exit via Sale to RedBird: Illustrates private transfers as viable routes, contingent on finding deep-pocketed buyers.

• Friedkin’s Everton Deal: Demonstrates strategic acquisitions by U.S. investors seeking opportunities in European football.

3. ROI Outcomes So Far

3.1 Profits & Losses on the Pitch

• Manchester United: Historical ROI has been negative in recent years (-15% in 2024), reflecting net losses and heavy debt burdens. Perhaps a £2 billion investment in a new stadium could change this.

• Chelsea: Reported a pre-tax profit of £128.4 million for the financial year ending June 2024, a significant turnaround from the £90.1 million loss recorded in the previous year. This shift was largely attributed to internal transactions, notably the sale of the women’s team to the club’s parent company, BlueCo, for £198.7 million. Such manoeuvres have raised questions regarding compliance with financial regulations. 

3.2 Mixed Results at Minority Stakes

• Hertha BSC: 777 Partners’ inability to fulfil a €100 million funding pledge has jeopardized their exit prospects, with creditors now planning asset sales.

• Inter Milan (Oaktree): A debt takeover in 2024 shows U.S. debt funds continuing niche entries, but ROI data remains opaque.

4. Barriers to Decent ROI

Clarifying ROI: I use ROI as a straightforward calculation based solely on entry and exit value. I’m avoiding more complex metrics like Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) or Internal Rate of Return (IRR), otherwise, this would become a much larger piece. I recognise that “on-paper” ROI doesn’t always capture the true financial outcome. For example, an investor might buy a football club for £100 million and sell it five years later for £105 million—an apparent ROI of just £5 million. But if they also drew £20 million annually in dividends or interest over those five years, their total return would be higher, painting a very different picture. And that’s before factoring in inflation or currency arbitrage.

• Regulatory Hurdles: UEFA’s infamous Financial Fair Play (FFP), Spain’s club assembly rules, and Germany’s 50+1 law can delay or even derail exits. Not to mention the Premier League’s Profit and Sustainability Rules (PSR), which share a similar intent but differ in thresholds and implementation mechanics.

• Political & Fan Resistance: Legal challenges (e.g., Real Madrid/Barcelona vs. CVC) and supporter backlash slow deal approvals.

• Media Rights Volatility: Collapsed deals (e.g., DAZN–Ligue 1) have depressed valuations in France and Italy, reducing buyer appetite.

5. Outlook: Path to a Decent ROI

Investments made between 2021 and 2023 are approaching their five-year mark in 2026–2028. Exits will likely combine:

• Minority stake sales to financial or strategic buyers – Wrexham is a clear example.

• SPAC listings or public offerings, as seen with John Textor’s ambitions and others following suit.

• Strategic refinancing, such as AC Milan’s vendor loan turnaround.

• Tapping into the next wave of capital by building relationships early, positioning for an acquisition over 2-3 years. Boom industries like AI are minting many new billionaires, and the first 100 employees of NVIDIA wouldn’t be a bad place to start.

Long-Term Strategic Value: Some investors view football clubs as more than just financial assets—seeing them as content-IP vehicles, brand-building platforms, sources of social capital, soft power, or cultural institutions. Their “returns” often come through audience engagement, brand equity, and community impact, rather than traditional balance-sheet gains. Red Bull’s multi-club ownership (MCO) model fits this category well: they currently own at least five clubs globally, with no signs of exiting any of them. In fact, they recently expanded into Asia by acquiring Japanese club Omiya Ardija in 2024 and took a minority stake in Leeds United last season.

Strategic and Commercial Returns: These returns can also extend beyond the balance sheet. A good example is Kroenke Sports & Entertainment consolidating the commercial and partnerships teams of Arsenal and the LA Rams to create synergies across their global portfolio. So, even if the eventual exit ROI is modest, acquiring multiple clubs or even taking a multi-sport approach – can still deliver a strategic win.

So, if you’re considering buying a football club, reflect on the points above and think carefully about your exit strategy. Football clubs can be notoriously difficult to sell if you are in a hurry.

Written by Alexander Jarvis, with special thanks to Jordan Wise for his contribution.